Interoperability as an "Essential Facility" in the Microsoft Case: Encouraging Stifling Competition or Innovation? by Andreangeli, Arianna
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interoperability as an "Essential Facility" in the Microsoft Case
Citation for published version:
Andreangeli, A 2009, 'Interoperability as an "Essential Facility" in the Microsoft Case:  Encouraging Stifling
Competition or Innovation?' European Law Review, vol 4, pp. 584-611.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Preprint (usually an early version)
Published In:
European Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Andreangeli, A. (2009). Interoperability as an "Essential Facility" in the Microsoft Case: Encouraging Stifling
Competition or Innovation?. European Law Review, 4, 584-611.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 1 
Interoperability as an “essential facility” in the Microsoft case—encouraging 
competition or stifling innovation?  
 
Arianna Andreangeli 
 
Introduction 
 
The EU Microsoft litigation, culminated with the CFI judgment of 17 September 
2007,1 represents a high profile victory for the European Commission’s approach to 
exclusionary conduct of dominant companies.2  However, the decision raises several 
questions on the application of Article 82 EC Treaty to refusals to grant access to 
inputs covered by intellectual property (IP) rights. 
         This article will analyse the approach adopted by the Commission and the CFI 
to Microsoft’s refusal to disclose interoperability information and assess its 
implications for the development of the principles governing exclusionary abuses.  
Thereafter, it will illustrate the Commission 2008 Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings (hereinafter referred to as the 2008 Guidance)3 
and consider it in the light of the principles resulting from the existing case law.4   
         It will be contended that the 2007 Microsoft judgment and the 2008 Guidance 
reflect the tension between, on the one hand, the need to encourage investment in 
research and development and, on the other hand, the achievement of effective 
competition, a tension which is particularly apparent in highly technological industries 
where rivalry is led by the pressure to innovate and de facto industrial leaders are 
destined to emerge.   
                                                 

 Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool.  The author is very grateful to Prof. Barry Rodger of 
the University of Strathclyde and the anonymous referee for the feedback on earlier drafts. A previous 
version of this article was presented as part of the Research Seminar Series run by Lincoln Law School, 
University of Lincoln on 25 March 2009.  Sincere thanks are owed to the series organisers for their 
invitation. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 
Microsoft judgment). 
2
 Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Microsoft Corp, document no C(2004) 900 (hereinafter 
referred to as the 2004 Microsoft decision). 
3
 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C(2009) 864C (final), 9 February 2009, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance_en.pdf (hereinafter referred to as 
2008 Guidance). 
4
 See joined cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents and ICI v Commission, [1964] ECR 223case C-
241/91, RTE and ITP v Commission, [1995] ECR I-743; case 7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint, 
[1998] ECR I-7781; case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR 
I-5039.  
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        The article will argue that the approach adopted by the CFI and the Commission 
in addressing this potential conflict, despite being consistent with a view of innovation 
as a “cooperative process” to which all undertakings should take part along with the 
leading supplier, may not be entirely appropriate to the need to reward and protect 
the value of investments in innovation driven markets.  
         In conclusion, the article will contend that Microsoft, despite its exceptional 
circumstances, has had an undeniable impact on the future enforcement priorities 
identified by the Commission, with potentially adverse and yet to be foreseen 
consequences for the incentives to invest in innovation driven industries.  Therefore, 
it will be suggested that due to the importance of encouraging future technical 
development through the promise of the rewards arising from transient market 
leadership, it might be desirable to “backtrack” from an essentially interventionist 
stance in the application of Article 82 EC Treaty to refusals to deal to the more 
restrained position emerging from the ECJ IMS Health and Bronner judgments.   
 
Refusals to deal in the Microsoft case 
 
Refusals to deal as abusive behaviour: the early cases 
 
Given the limited scope of this article, it is not possible to analyse in detail the case 
law governing the refusal by a dominant undertaking to deal with other firms, 
including its rivals.  However, it is necessary to recall briefly the relevant rules 
developed by the ECJ.  The Court has long recognised that, in principle, every 
undertaking, even one enjoying significant market power, is free to choose its 
business partners and therefore to refuse to deal with a specific firm.5  At the same 
time, other decisions have acknowledged that there may be “exceptional 
circumstances” in which interrupting an existing commercial relationship, refusing to 
start ex novo supplies to another undertaking, denying access to an input or an 
infrastructure as well as denying the grant of an intellectual property licence may 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position.6 
                                                 
5
 See e.g. case 238/87, VOLVO v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211; also, mutatis mutandis, US v Colgate & Co, 
250 S. Ct. 300 US (1919), p. 307; also US v Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis, 224 US 383 
(1912); Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Co, 472 US 585 (1985).  Cf. Verizon 
Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004), per Scalia J, p. 409. 
6
 Inter alia, case 238/87, VOLVO v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211, para. 8.  See e.g. Evans and Padilla, The 
Law and Economics of Article 82 EC Treaty, 2006, Oxford/Portland OR: Hart Publishing, p. 408. 
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         In Commercial Solvents7 the ECJ held that the refusal by a dominant 
undertaking to continue supplying one of its long standing customers, active on a 
downstream market, with an input which was “essential” for the latter to keep 
producing a derivative product constituted an infringement of Article 82 EC Treaty.8  
The Court took the view that, despite being motivated by a plan to vertically integrate 
the two business activities, the refusal would have resulted in Commercial Solvents’ 
nearest competitor being excluded from the downstream market for the finite drug 
and allowed it to extend its monopoly power to it,9 to the detriment of the overall 
integrity of the competitive process.10   
         The Commission and the ECJ extended the principles laid down in this 
judgment to a number of situations characterised by the existence of a “vertical” 
relationship between the dominant undertaking and its competitors as a result of 
which the former controlled access to infrastructures, inputs or other “facilities” 
deemed to be “indispensable” for the performance of business activities in 
downstream markets because they could not be physically or financially duplicated.11  
However, they were also mindful of the circumstance that imposing the forced 
disclosure or the compulsory access on a dominant undertaking not only struck at the 
heart of one of the main tenets of the market economy, i.e. freedom of contract, but 
could also jeopardise the incentive to future investment.12   
         Consequently, the ECJ initially adopted a seemingly narrow reading of Article 
82 to refusals to grant IP licenses.  The Court stated in VOLVO13 that imposing an 
obligation to licence IP rights would have deprived their proprietor of its very 
essence14 and held that the refusal to grant a license would be prohibited by Article 
82 of the Treaty only if it involved other abusive practices, such as the charging of 
unreasonably high prices or the “arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts”, especially 
those required to service cars which were still in circulation.15 
                                                 
7
 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents and ICI v Commission, [1964] ECR 223. 
8
 Id., para. 23. 
9
 Id., para. 24.  See also, mutatis mutandis, 2008 Communication, supra, (fn.2), pra. 22 and 74. 
10
Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents and ICI v Commission, [1964] ECR 223, para. 25.  
See e.g. Evans and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC Treaty, 2006, Oxford/Portland 
OR: Hart Publishing, p. 409-410, 424. 
11
 See e.g. Nagy, “Refusal to deal and the doctrine of essential facilities in US and EC competition law: 
a comparative perspective and a proposal for a workable analytical framework”, (2007) 32(5) ELRev 
664, especially pp. 647 ff. 
12
 See, inter alia, US v Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis, 224 US 383 (1912); Aspen Skiing Co 
v Aspen Highlands Skiing Co, 472 US 585 (1985). 
13
 Case 238/87, [1988] ECR 6211. 
14
 Id., para. 8. 
15
 Id., para. 9. 
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         However, in the later Magill case16 the ECJ was willing to extend the 
Commercial Solvents principles to the refusal to grant a copyright licence allowing 
the licensee to compete on the downstream market (the market for the supply of TV 
guides) in which the input covered by IP rights (in that case TV listings) was 
“indispensable”.17  It was held that although the ownership of an intellectual property 
right did not confer on an undertaking a dominant position in and of itself, there could 
be “exceptional circumstances” in which the refusal to grant a licence for the use of 
the element covered by that right would infringe Article 82 EC Treaty.18  This would 
occur if the refusal prevented the undertaking seeking the licence from supplying a 
new product for which there was a potential consumer demand and thus allowed the 
dominant undertaking to reserve to itself a de facto monopoly on the downstream 
market and was not objectively justified.19 
         In Bronner, a judgment relating to the refusal to grant access to tangible inputs, 
the ECJ clarified the meaning of “indispensability” for the purposes of Article 82.  It 
held that the firm seeking access would have to prove that there are no “alternative 
solutions, even if they are less advantageous” due to “technical, legal or economic 
obstacles capable of making it impossible or at least unreasonably difficult” for 
competing suppliers “to create, possibly in cooperation with other operators, the 
alternative products or services”.20     
         In the later IMS Health21 preliminary ruling, the ECJ confirmed that the “new 
product” requirement laid down in Magill sought to strike a balance between the 
interests of effective competition, especially on related or neighbouring markets, and 
the need to foster, at least to some degree technical innovation.22  Consequently, it 
held that in cases concerning refusals to grant an IP licence the freedom of the 
owner of an intellectual property right would only be restricted to the extent that was 
strictly necessary to allow competitors active downstream to supply novel products.23  
As a result, this type of conduct would infringe Article 82 if four conditions were 
satisfied and unless the dominant firm could prove that its behaviour was “objectively 
justified”: first, it must be possible to identify two distinct levels of supply, even if only 
potential, one for the “essential” input, the other for the provision of products or 
                                                 
16
 Case C-241/91, RTE and ITP v Commission, [1995] ECR I-743. 
17
 Id., para. 55; see also para. 73. 
18
 Id., para. 50. 
19
 Id., para. 51-52, 54, 73. 
20
 Id., para. 28. 
21
 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR I-5039.  
22
 See Hatzopoulos, “Refusal to Deal: the EC essential facilities doctrine”, in Amato and Ehlermann 
(Eds.), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2006: Oxford, Portland OR, Hart Publishing, p. 
354.  
23
 Case 7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7781, para. 49. 
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services for which the latter is necessary; second, the refusal must concern an 
“indispensable input”; third, the refusal must prevent the emergence of a new product 
for which potential consumer demand exists and, finally, must be such as to exclude 
competition from the downstream market.24 
         The IMS Health test, however, left open a number of questions: having regard 
to the notion of “new product”, the judgment was silent on whether “follow on 
innovation”, namely the supply of goods or services constituting only an “upgraded” 
version of existing ones, could fulfil that requirement.  On this point, AG Tizzano 
stated in his Opinion that the “balance between the interest in protection of the 
intellectual property right and the economic freedom of its owner, on the one hand, 
and the interest in protection of free competition, on the other” should be struck in 
favour of ensuring genuine competition “only if the refusal (…) [prevented] the 
development of a secondary market to the detriment of consumers”,25 by preventing 
competing suppliers from producing “goods or services of a different nature which, 
although in competition with those of the owner of the right, answer specific 
consumer requirements not satisfied” by products already available.26  Thus, it could 
be argued that, for a refusal to grant an IP licence to be abusive, the party requesting 
it would have to demonstrate that it is planning to supply not just an “upgraded” 
version of an existing product, but output displaying a significant degree of novelty 
vis-à-vis goods or services already available on the market.27   
         Another unresolved question was whether a dominant undertaking could argue 
that the refusal to license, especially aimed to a competitor, was necessary to allow it 
to recoup the value of its investment and, therefore, could be “objectively justified”.28  
The Commission recognised in its 2005 Discussion Paper on the application of 
Article 82 to exclusionary abuses (hereinafter referred to as 2005 Discussion 
Paper)29 that any input protected by an intellectual property right, even an 
“indispensable” one, was often the outcome of significant investments involving risk 
                                                 
24
 See case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 
45; also Opinion of AG Tizzano, para. 56-57. 
25
 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR I-5039, per AG 
Tizzano, para. 62. 
26
 Ibid.  Cf. 2005 Discussion Paper, para. 240. See infra, section 3.1. 
27
 See, inter alia, Hatzopoulos, “Refusal to Deal: the EC essential facilities doctrine”, in Amato and 
Ehlermann (Eds.), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2006: Oxford, Portland OR, Hart 
Publishing, p. 354. 
28
 See e.g., Glader, Innovation markets and competition analysis, 2006: Chelthenham, E Elgar 
Publishers, p. 292. 
29
 2005 Commission DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary 
abuses, December 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, 
hereinafter referred to as “2005 Discussion Paper”, para. 240. 
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and that “to maintain incentives to innovate, the dominant firm should not be unduly 
restricted” in its ability to enjoy the benefits of its innovation efforts.30   
         Accordingly, it stated that a dominant undertaking could “reward its investment 
by seeking appropriate compensation for it as well as by restricting the availability 
and/or the access” to the outcome of its innovation efforts,31 but only for the time 
necessary “to ensure an adequate return” on the investment.32  The Commission 
would also consider “the respective values that are at stake” and especially, on the 
one hand, any “possible positive effects on incentives to follow-on investment from 
allowing access”33 and, on the other hand, the need to allow consumers to “benefit 
from innovation brought about by the dominant undertaking’s competitors.”34   
         In the light of the above, it could be argued that the Commission was mindful of 
the “tension” existing between the competing goals of effective competition and of 
unfettered incentive to innovation arising from ordering the forced access to inputs 
covered by intellectual property rights.  However, the 2005 Discussion Paper 
suggested that any objective justification arguments based on the need to protect the 
dominant undertaking’s incentive to innovate would probably be unsuccessful, 
especially when the refusal to grant a licence was likely to result in stifling further 
technical development, whether “radical” or “follow on”.35   
         Consequently, it is concluded that although the freedom to choose business 
partners is recognised even to undertakings enjoying significant market power, there 
may be cases in which their refusal to deal with other firms could constitute abusive 
behaviour caught by Article 82 of the EC Treaty.  Nevertheless, the possibility of 
imposing an obligation to share the outcome of expensive and risky investment and 
especially granting intellectual property licences should be carefully assessed in 
order to avoid stifling future innovation.  It could be argued that whereas the 
ECJ in IMS Health emphasised the need to strike a balance between the 
interest of genuine competition and the need to reward adequately and 
encourage innovation, the Commission preferred to adopt an approach 
favouring “follow-on” innovation, which may not, however, be entirely 
capable of preserving the drive to technical development in highly 
technological industries.   
                                                 
30
 2005 Discussion Paper, para. 235. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Id., para. 236. 
34
 Id., para. 240. 
35
 See e.g. Rousseva, “Abuse of dominant position defences: objective justification and Article 82 in 
the era of Modernisation”, in Amato and Ehlermann (Eds), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 
2007: Oxford/Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, pp. 417-418, 430-431. 
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         The next sections will examine the position of the Commission and the CFI as 
regards the refusal to grant IP licences in the software industry with a view to 
assessing whether the outcome of the Microsoft case represented a suitable 
response to the need to reconcile the competing interests of promoting competition 
as well as fostering technical advancement. 
 
The 2004 Commission decision in ‘Microsoft’ 
 
As is well know, in 200436 the Commission found that Microsoft’s refusal to continue 
to disclose interoperability information relating to its personal computer operating 
system (hereinafter referred to as PC OS) to independent suppliers active on 
the separate market for work-group server OS constituted an infringement of Article 
82 EC Treaty.37  It was held that, given Microsoft’s dominance on both the PC 
operating systems and the work group server OS market38 and the “strong 
commercial and technical associative links” between the two markets,39 its conduct 
prevented independent software providers from developing software that could 
“seamlessly integrate” with Microsoft-run servers.40   
         Due to its unrivalled economic power on the market for the supply of PC 
operating system,41 Microsoft had in fact been able to “determine (…) independently 
from its competitors the set of coherent communication rules that will govern the de 
facto standard for interoperability in work group networks”.42  Its refusal to continue 
providing its competitors with the information necessary to achieve and maintain 
interoperability therefore created a risk of both stifling competition on that market43 
and hampering innovation44 by “locking” existing and future users in its domain 
architecture45 and eventually excluding viable competitors on the work group server 
OS market.46  In the Commission’s view, these adverse effects on technical 
development could not be counterbalanced by the need to safeguard Microsoft’s own 
incentives to innovate.   
                                                 
36
  Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Microsoft Corp, document no C(2004) 900 (hereinafter 
referred to as the 2004 Microsoft decision). 
37
  Id., para. 573-75; see also para. 578-583. 
38
 Id., para. 541. 
39
 See 2004 Microsoft Decision, supra. (fn. 3), para. 526. 
40
 Id., para.572, 665, 692-694. 
41
 Id., para. 530.  See Montagnani, “Remedies to exclusionary innovation in the high-tech sector: s 
there a lesson from the Microsoft saga?”, (2007) 30(4) W. Comp. 623 at 625. 
42
 Id., para. 779. 
43
 Id., para. 781. 
44
 Id., para. 782. 
45
 Id., para. 782. 
46
 Id., para. 779.781. 
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         Consequently, the Commission, concerned with avoiding that its interruption of 
the disclosure of interoperability information could threaten “follow on” innovation and 
thus hamper any remaining competition on an adjacent market,47 took the view that, 
due to its overwhelming market power on the “primary” market for OC OS software, 
Microsoft’s conduct constituted an abuse of its dominant position.48  In fact, 
discontinuing access to the protocols would have disrupted innovation and eventually 
eliminated competition in a key market for the future development of the software 
industry.49  
         Glader argued that Microsoft’s conduct was clearly motivated by a decision to 
“branch out” on the related market for the supply of work group server OS.50  
Nonetheless, that strategy, even though it was economically rational, would have 
allowed it to “shape technological development” and thereby reinforce its leadership 
not only on the PC OS market, on which Microsoft was already incontestably 
dominant, but also on the related market for the supply of server OS, which, instead, 
remained relatively competitive.51       
         The 2004 Microsoft decision was widely debated and the limited purvey of this 
article does not allow to comment any further on its findings.52  However, it is clear 
that this case put to the test the current principles governing refusals to deal under 
Article 82 EC Treaty in respect to the software market and more generally that for 
highly technological products.  The next section will consider the CFI appeal 
judgment and analyse the extent to which it represented an appropriate response to 
the competition dynamics of the market.  
 
The 2007 appeal judgment in ‘Microsoft’ 
 
Section 2.2 briefly illustrated the 2004 Commission decision finding that, by 
discontinuing the disclosure of interoperability information to its competitors on the 
work group server OS market, Microsoft had abused its dominant position.  Although 
any more in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this work, it is necessary at this 
                                                 
47
 Glader, cit. above (footnote 28), p. 289. 
48
 See Microsoft decision, para. 779-781. 
49
 Glader, cit. above (footnote 28), p. 287. 
50
 Id.,p. 288. 
51
 Ibid. See 2004 Microsoft decision, para. 783. 
52
 See e.g. Pardolesi and Renda, “The European Commission’s case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?”, 
(2004) 27(4) W. Comp. 513; Geradin, “Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: what can the EU learn 
from the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche 
Telekom?”, (2004) 41 (6) CMLRev 1519.  
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junction to examine briefly some of the economic features of highly innovative 
industries, including that for the production of software.   
         As was pointed out by the Commission itself in its decision, computer software 
is designed to interact with other products and should therefore be able to 
interconnect and function “seamlessly” with other software as well as with 
hardware,53 to allow individual users to enjoy a reciprocal dialogue between 
machines both as part of and between networks.54  Consequently, it was suggested 
that “the utility that a user derives from the consumption” of a particular programme is 
destined to increase with the number of its users55 and that, as a result of its “wide 
acceptance”, a particular programme is likely to become “entrenched” as the “format 
of choice” for end users in a particular market and, thus, as the industry standard in a 
specific period of time.56  Consequently, its owner would be likely to dominate the 
market until a better, more efficient format displaced the hitherto “entrenched” 
champion.57 
         The peculiar features of the software market, i.e. its “network effects”, were 
taken into account by the 4th Circuit of the US Court of Appeals in its order in the Re: 
Microsoft Antitrust Litigation,58 concerning the tied sale of Windows together with 
Microsoft’s own internet browser. The order explained that the “positive feedback 
effect” arising from the adoption of particular software, namely the circumstance that 
its “attractiveness (…) to consumers [increased] with the number of persons using it”, 
had allowed it to emerge as the leading industry standard.59 It pointed out that 
customers on the PC OS market, on the one hand, would adopt more and more 
frequently the “entrenched format” as their PC interface and complementary software 
and hardware designers, on the other hand, would construct applications and content 
compatible with that de facto standard to reach the widest possible “audience”.60  
However, due to the importance of compatibility as a decisive factor influencing 
customers’ choice, the trends characterising the development of this market would 
inevitably result in excluding any competing format from the market and in allowing 
the supplier of the “industry standard” to become the “winner takes all” firm. 
                                                 
53
 See, e.g., 2004 Microsoft decision, para. 732 ff. 
54
 Pardolesi and Renda, “The European Commission’s case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?”, (2004) 27(4) 
W. Comp. 513 at 526-527. 
55
Ibid. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid.  For commentary, see, inter alia, Montagnani, “Remedies to exclusionary innovation in the 
high-tech sector: s there a lesson from the Microsoft saga?”, (2007) 30(4) W. Comp. 623 at 625. 
58
 In re: Microsoft Corporation Antitrust Litigation—Sun Microsystem Inc v Microsoft, 333 F. 3rd 517. 
59
 Per curiam, p. 521, fn.1. 
60
 Ibid. 
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           It is against this economic background that the CFI judgment in Microsoft 
should be analysed.  The appeal judgment started with an assessment of the degree 
of interoperability required by the Commission in its 2004 decision.  It was held that, 
given the indissociable links existing between client-server and server-server 
interoperability within Windows’ domain architecture, competing suppliers should be 
granted access to both sets of protocols to be able to offer compatible software to 
Microsoft’s own OS and thus compete effectively on the work-group server OS 
market.61  The CFI, therefore, rejected Microsoft’s allegations that the Commission 
had adopted too wide a view of the concept of interoperability and that this notion 
should be limited only to protocols allowing for “client/server” interconnection.  It took 
the different view that competing suppliers should be able to manufacture work group 
server OS able to function within wider networks operated by Windows’ own OS.62   
         Thereafter, the Court assessed whether the Commission had correctly applied 
the principles governing refusals by dominant undertakings to grant IP licences.  It 
reiterated that, although in principle even undertakings enjoying significant market 
power were entitled to select freely its business partners, there may be “exceptional 
circumstances” when their refusal to deal constituted an abuse under Article 82.63   
         The CFI held that denying an IP licence without any objective justification 
would infringe the antitrust rules if the input at issue was “indispensable” for the 
performance of a given business activity, the refusal prevented the appearance of a 
“new product that was not currently supplied” and for which potential consumer 
demand existed.64  However, the Court rejected Microsoft’s allegations that the case 
law provided an exhaustive list of requirements.  Instead, it agreed with the 
Commission that the IMS Health preliminary ruling should be read as establishing 
only an “open ended set of conditions”,65 i.e. a number of factors that would be 
“relevant” but whose existence and significance had to be assessed against the 
background of each case.66 
                                                 
61
 Id., para. 230-231. 
62
 See 2004 Microsoft decision, para. 178-179.  For commentary, Larouche, “The European Microsoft 
case at the crossroads of competition policy and innovation”, TILEC Discussion Paper, May 2008, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140165#, p. 8.  An updated version 
of the paper is also available as “The European Microsoft case at the crossroads of competition policy 
and innovation: comment to Ahlborn and Evans”, (2008) 75(3) Antitrust L J 933. 
63
 2007 Microsoft judgment, para. 319.  See e.g. case 238/87, VOLVO v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211, para. 
8-9. 
64
 2007 Microsoft judgment, para. 324. 
65
 Larouche, “The European Microsoft case at the crossroads of competition policy and innovation”, 
cit. (footnote 62), p. 7.   
66
 Id., para. 332.  For commentary, see Anderman, “Does the Microsoft case offer a new paradigm for 
the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ test and compulsory copyright licenses under EC Competition law?”, 
(2004) 2(1) CompLRev 7 at 15. 
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         Having regard to the “indispensability” condition, the CFI noted that the 
information sought by Microsoft’s competitors constituted an element “of significant 
competitive importance” without which other suppliers could not operate viably on a 
related market, due to Microsoft’s overwhelming dominance on the PC OS market.67 
The Court pointed out that, given the nature of software as a product that cannot 
function in isolation but is destined to interact with other products,68 ensuring 
interoperability between PCs linked up in networks as well as between networks was 
essential for competing suppliers to remain profitable on that market.69  
Consequently, it was concluded that the interoperability protocols constituted an 
indispensable input for the purpose of Article 82 of the Treaty.  
          The CFI, then, considered whether the refusal to disclose the required 
interoperability protocols had prevented the emergence of a “new product” for which 
potential demand existed on the work group server software market.70  It rejected the 
applicant’s assertion that this condition would be met only when the allegedly abusive 
conduct had prevented the supply of products or services not currently offered by the 
owner of the “indispensable” input.71 The Court, therefore, accepted the 
Commission’s literal reading of Article 82 (b) of the Treaty, according to which any 
form of conduct “limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers” would be abusive72 and took the view that to hold otherwise 
would, in substance, amount to enabling a dominant undertaking on the market for 
the supply of the “primary” product to prevent the development of a secondary 
market for the supply of “auxiliary” goods.73   
         The CFI also found that allowing Microsoft to refuse to licence its 
interconnection protocols would be detrimental to consumer welfare since, as a result 
of the applicant’s conduct, the preferences of customers had been “channelled” 
toward the entrenched format, although non-Microsoft OS had been regarded as 
“better alternatives” to the dominant software.74  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
the interruption of the disclosure of interoperability information had infringed Article 
82 since it had prevented Microsoft’s rivals from supplying sufficiently compatible 
work group server software that could compete with the applicant’s own software. 
                                                 
67
 2007 Microsoft judgment, para. 381; see, e.g., case C-7/97, BronnerGmbH & Co v Mediaprint, 
[1998] ECR I-7791, para. 47. 
68
2007 Microsoft judgment, para. 383. 
69
 Id., para. 387. 
70
 Id., para. 334. 
71
 Id., para. 626. 
72
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         Thereafter, the Court addressed the question whether the refusal was such as 
to exclude all competition from a secondary market.75  It rejected the argument that 
this condition should have been interpreted as meaning that there was a “high 
probability” that competition would be eliminated from the relevant market76 and held 
that the spirit of the Treaty and the function of Article 82 required the Commission to 
tackle Microsoft’s behaviour before all competition had been eliminated from the 
market.77   
         The CFI reviewed the Commission’s analysis of the trends of the market shares 
held by Microsoft and by its competitors and took the view that the refusal to supply 
interoperability information had de facto marginalised a number of competing 
suppliers from the market to the point that they no longer constituted a “credible 
threat” to the dominant firm.78  In the Court’s view, the impact of the practice was also 
very likely to become irreversible due to the market’s network effects:79 it was held 
that the entrenchment of Microsoft’s own work group server OS, resulting from the 
denial of access to the interconnection protocols, had, firstly, prevented customers 
from switching to competing OS80 and, secondly, had encouraged developers of 
auxiliary software and contents as well as technicians to develop the necessary 
expertise and complementary services that would be compatible with the leading 
format, to the detriment of suppliers of alternative software.81   As a result, the 
applicant, who had already imposed its own product as the industry standard on the 
market for the supply of PC OS,82 had been able to extend its market power to the 
related market for the provision of work group server OS and thereby ensure that its 
domain architecture would become the leading format therein.83  
         Finally, in respect to the requirement of absence of objective justification, the 
CFI held that the sole fact that the protocols were covered by copyright could not be 
relied on to avoid a finding of infringement, since it would be tantamount to rendering 
inapplicable the exception established by the ECJ.84  It emphasised that the 
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disclosure of interoperability information was a “common practice” in the industry85 
and that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence that revealing its 
interconnection protocols would have hampered its incentive to innovate its 
products.86   
         Nor could Microsoft’s refusal be justified by the need to avoid that its OS could 
be duplicated.87 The CFI stated that the obligation did not extend to the specifications 
defining the “internal logic” of Windows88 and that in any event the competing 
suppliers lacked any “commercial incentive” to reproduce Microsoft’s software 
because, if they wished to “survive” on the market for the supply of work group server 
OS, they would have had to “differentiate” their products from the dominant format.89 
         The analysis conducted so far has illustrated that the Microsoft case confronted 
the Commission and the CFI with two apparently conflicting interests, namely the 
need, on the one hand, to reward and support investment in innovation and, on the 
other hand, to maintain genuine competition even on markets, such as that for the 
supply of software, is characterised by network effects and by a trend toward the 
emergence of an “industry leader”.   
         More generally, Microsoft could be interpreted as reflecting a “clash” between 
two opposing views of competition and innovation: one is based on investment in 
research and development and on the idea of “competition for the market”, by means 
of the emergence and the temporary entrenchment of a “superior product”.90  The 
other, envisages competition and innovation as the outcome of a process in which 
competing suppliers, even those less efficient than the “winner”, should be allowed to 
participate and, therefore, accepts that the leading supplier should allow its 
competitors to share the benefits of the investment required to produce the “industry 
standard” by means of forced access to the output of that innovation.91 
            However, it could be argued that embracing this idea of competition “on the 
market” may have chilling effects on further investment in the development of new 
technologies and, especially in innovative industries, where competition is driven by 
investments in research and development, and freeze the drive to compete ultimately 
for the best product to emerge as the leading standard.92   
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         Consequently, the central question appears to be how to reward the efforts of 
technological development of the “winning” supplier while avoiding the possibility of a 
“winning product” becoming so entrenched as to prevent the emergence of a more 
efficient, and thus preferable, alternative output.93 This will be addressed in the next 
section.  
 
Refusals to license and Article 82: what are the implications of ‘Microsoft’? 
 
The previous sections considered the Microsoft judgment and highlighted how the 
CFI decision struck at the heart of the debate concerning the nature and the goals of 
the competitive process, especially in highly technological markets. The first 
controversial point arising from the case concerned the notion of “interoperability” 
prevailing in the CFI decision: it is reminded that, according to the Court, this concept 
should extend to client/client as well as to client/server interoperability, to enable 
servers and PCs operated by competing OS to act as “domain controllers” as well as 
“clients” within the Microsoft domain architecture.94   
         However, this view may be contrasted with the 1984 IBM Undertaking,95 
according to which the obligation imposed on a dominant undertaking to license 
interface information was limited to those specifications allowing competing suppliers 
to manufacture compatible hardware and software compatible with IBM standards.96  
Although the obligation imposed on Microsoft stopped short of permitting competing 
suppliers to access the “source code” of the dominant OS and may not therefore 
allow for its complete “cloning”, whether its scope is compatible with the need to 
preserve the drive to innovation on the market remains open to question.97    
         As was briefly explained above, due to the “network effects” inherent in the 
nature of software as a good designed to interact with other products,98  a trend is 
very likely to emerge in favour of a “popular” format amongst end users and 
installers, technicians and suppliers of content and complementary software,99 which 
will eventually dominate the market, albeit temporarily. Consequently, it could be 
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argued that, in innovation driven industries where the most successful innovator 
becomes the market leader for some time”,100 competition tends to occur at the early 
stage of the development of competing products and brings with it, on the one hand, 
high sunk costs and, on the other hand, the perspective of high returns through the 
(transient) entrenchment of their products, linked to the associated network effects.101 
         These dynamics can deliver a number of advantages to consumers, such as 
fostering fast paced innovation and leading to the supply of products that have better 
technical qualities and thus are more suitable to the needs of its users.102  The 
positive aspects of the network externalities associated with the widespread 
presence of the existing leading standard are also likely to benefit end users by 
enabling them to connect with a large customer-based and obtain support from 
providers of media contents and support services.103   
         In the light of the above, it is contended that antitrust enforcement should seek 
to enhance the process of innovation driven competition and the resulting 
introduction of new products and thereby maintaining pressure on the leader as well 
as on its rivals to continue investing in it.104 Consequently, its focus should not be on 
forcing the disclosure of compatibility information after a de facto leader has already 
emerged,105 but on the provision of effective systems for technology trading which 
would avoid the foreclosure of the market and strengthen the incentive to innovate, 
especially on the part of the leading firm.106 
         Against this background, it is argued that the 2004 Microsoft decision was 
concerned with reducing the risk that, once the de facto standard had become 
established, the positive feedback loop associated with its widespread adoption 
would have led to the stifling of competition “on the market”, rather than with boosting 
the drive to invest in research and development by both Microsoft and its rivals.107   
         On this point, it is suggested that the solution adopted in Microsoft could be 
justified by the need to avoid that the applicant could both further entrench its 
leadership on the market for PC OS and extend its market power on to the market for 
the supply of work group server OS. Ong argued that the applicant had de facto 
succeeded in rendering the OS users de facto dependent on Windows by recourse to 
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choices of design and promotion as well as by relying on the legal protection afforded 
to it by its intellectual property rights on the interoperability protocols and interface 
specifications.108 
           It is submitted that just as in Commercial Solvents,109 Microsoft’s interruption 
of the supply of information necessary to guarantee interoperability with the 
“entrenched” software had in fact prevented alternative suppliers from developing OS 
that could “interconnect” with Windows-operated machines and networks, to the 
prejudice of technical development and consumer welfare.110  It would thus appear 
that the demands of “genuine competition” on that downstream market justified both 
the wide interpretation of the concept of interoperability and the finding of 
indispensability of the protocols.111   
           However, it could be argued that these conclusions may not be easy to 
reconcile with the need to foster the incentive to innovate, even on the part of 
dominant undertakings and on their competitors.112  Although it is acknowledged that 
the exclusivity of intellectual property rights creates a tension with some aspects of 
the genuine competition process,113 it is nonetheless necessary to “strike a balance” 
between preserving competition especially in respect to the supply of similar auxiliary 
goods or services and safeguarding innovation through the promise of appropriate 
financial rewards for it, thereby enhancing competition “for the market”.114  
         It is suggested that the Microsoft judgment has tipped the scales in favour of 
Microsoft’s rivals and thus of competition “on the market”.  It could be questioned 
whether the notion of “full interoperability”, despite having short term benefits for the 
ability of alternative suppliers of work group server OS to continue manufacturing 
compatible products due to the availability of the interconnection protocols,115 can 
also lead to appreciable medium and long term advantages for innovation.  It is 
submitted that the imposition of such a broad obligation may encourage the 
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“emulation” of a de facto standard rather than the investment in new technologies 
which would eventually “displace” the leading software.116   
         The apparently “benevolent” attitude of the CFI for competitors seems to 
emerge also from its interpretation of the notion of “indispensability”.117  In Microsoft, 
the CFI took the view that the “indispensability” of the interoperability information 
would depend on whether it constituted an element of such a “significant competitive 
importance” for Microsoft’s competitors on the market for work group server OS118 
that, without it, alternative suppliers could not remain “viable” and “attractive” 
substitutes to Microsoft’s software.119   
         The Court also emphasised the characteristics of the product as well as the 
extraordinary circumstances of the case and especially the overwhelming dominance 
enjoyed by the applicant.120  Accordingly, it took the view that access to the interface 
specifications necessary to allow machines operated by alternative OS to “participate 
in the Windows’ domain architecture (…) on an equal footing” as machines operated 
by Windows itself would be the only way in which competing suppliers could remain 
“viable” and “attractive” alternatives to Microsoft in the eyes of end users.  By 
contrast, the ECJ had defined this condition as the absence of any “actual or 
potential substitute” for the input controlled by the dominant undertaking121 so that, in 
the words of AG Jacobs, its “duplication (…) [would be] impossible or extremely 
difficult owing to physical, geographical or legal constraints or is highly undesirable 
for reasons of public policy”122 or the costs associated with it could “deter any prudent 
undertaking from entering the market”.123  
          In the light of the principles laid down by the ECJ, it is argued that the CFI 
refrained from considering whether other ways to ensure interoperability, such as the 
availability of interconnection protocols already in the public domain, “reverse 
engineering” or the existence of “open source” software, could achieve the same 
objective without having to force Microsoft to disclose its information.124  
Commentators argued that the overwhelming market power enjoyed by the applicant 
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and the positive feedback effects characterising the industry constituted key factors 
in the CFI’s findings.125  Although these concerns cannot be dismissed outright, it 
may be contended that the breadth of the obligation imposed on Microsoft and its 
potential implications for the incentives to innovate could have justified a closer look 
at the available alternatives and greater adherence to the Bronner concept of 
“indispensability”.126   
         Another thorny issue concerns the interpretation of the “new product” 
requirement.  According to the IMS Health preliminary ruling, the function of 
this requirement is to strike a balance between the protection of IP rights 
and especially the freedom of their holder to choose whether and to whom 
to grant a licence and the need to safeguard and encourage genuine 
competition. 127  The ECJ indicated that the interests of competition would 
only prevail if it could be shown that the refusal to grant a licence precluded the 
development of a secondary market by not allowing competitors to supply “new 
goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is potential 
consumer demand”,128  to the detriment of consumer welfare.129  
         By contrast, it was held in the 2007 Microsoft judgment that this requirement 
should be read as encompassing not only “a limitation (…) of production or markets, 
but also of technical development”.130  The CFI took the view that the emergence of a 
“new” product could not “be the only parameter” in the assessment of the nature of 
Microsoft’s conduct131 but that consumer welfare could be equally prejudiced if, due 
to the interruption of the disclosure of the interoperability information, competitor 
swere unable to supply workgroup server OS that could “be distinguished from 
[Windows systems] with respect to parameters which consumers consider 
important.”132    
         Microsoft’s refusal to grant a licence to competing suppliers therefore infringed 
Article 82 EC Treaty since it prevented the appearance of work group server OS that 
would be compatible with Microsoft’s own architecture to a degree sufficient to 
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provide a “realistic” alternative to Microsoft’s own software for individual users, who 
would “otherwise be ‘locked in’ a homogenous Windows solution”,133 despite not 
being a “breakthrough product”.134  
         The CFI took the view that the emergence of a “new” product could not “be the 
only parameter” in the assessment of the nature of Microsoft’s conduct135 but that 
consumer welfare could be equally prejudiced if, due to the interruption of the 
disclosure of the interoperability information, competitors were unable to supply 
workgroup server OS that could “be distinguished from [Windows systems] with 
respect to parameters which consumers consider important.”136   
         It would appear that, as was argued above, the Court was concerned with 
countervailing the effects of the “positive feedback loop” arising from the 
entrenchment of Windows.137  Nonetheless, it is contended that the concept of “new 
product” adopted by the CFI in Microsoft, being far less exacting than the one 
adopted in IMS Health, could have unpredictable and perhaps adverse effects on the 
dynamics of innovation driven markets, in as much as it could privilege “follow-on” 
innovation to the detriment of investment in “brand new” technological progress.138   
         On this point, Larouche suggested that the CFI conclusions “simply assume 
that (…) competition on the market (…) is preferable”139 to “breakthrough 
innovation”140 without considering, however, whether this choice was actually 
compatible with the need to support the drive of the industry leader as well as of its 
competitors to continue innovating in high-tech markets, especially by “pushing” 
them, in substance to engage in forms of “radical innovation” and thereby to break 
away from a “common technological environment”.141  
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         Finally, in respect of “objective justification”, the CFI, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
rejected Microsoft’s allegations that its refusal could have been prompted by 
“objective factors”, i.e. the need to protect the value of its investment and its incentive 
to innovate.142  The Court held that Microsoft had put forward only “theoretical” pleas 
and that, in any event, the scope of the obligation to disclose interoperability 
information resulting from the 2004 decision did not enable competitors to supply a 
“replica” of Windows143 and was in any event consistent with a “common practice” in 
the industry.144  It added that, rather than hampering it, access to these protocols had 
the potential to reinforce Microsoft’s own drive to innovate, if it wanted to countervail 
competition from alternative suppliers who would take advantage of the available 
information.145 
         However, it could be argued that this approach, despite being capable of 
avoiding any “hold up” in the development of secondary products,146 could result in 
the “distortion of incentives” to future technical development: it was suggested that 
even if technology trading mechanisms were fully efficient, neither the original nor the 
“follow on” innovator would receive a full reward for their investment efforts.147  The 
“first” innovator, on the one hand, could not reap sufficient revenue to reflect the “full 
value”, both economic and social, of its invention, and the second-generation 
inventor, on the other hand, would be discouraged from continuing to invest in new, 
potentially breakthrough forms of innovation.148   
         Against this background, it is contended that the CFI should have 
analysed more closely the impact of the obligation to disclose the 
copyrighted specifications on the incentive to innovate of the applicant.  
Although, in the light of Article 230 EC Treaty, its powers are limited to a 
supervisory jurisdiction, it is submitted that a more careful assessment of 
these implication would have allowed the Court to limit the risk that this 
potential for distortion could play against the first generation innovator.149   
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           Strictly related to these considerations is the CFI’s examination of the 
“efficiency defence” put forward by Microsoft.  The Court accepted the Commission’s 
finding that any efficiency-enhancing effects of Microsoft’s practice, especially in 
terms of creating stronger incentives to innovate as discussed above, should have 
been weighed against the impact of its refusal to disclose interoperability protocols 
on the overall development of the work group server OS market.150  On this point, 
the Commission had stated in its 2005 Discussion Paper that, for prima 
facie abusive conduct to be justified on account of its efficiency-enhancing 
effects, four conditions must be fulfilled: the practice must result in, or be 
likely to lead to, efficiencies and be indispensable to attain them.  It must 
also be shown that consumers are able to reap these benefits and, finally 
that the conduct is not able to eliminate competition from a substantial 
part of the relevant market.151 
         Although to date no judgment has recognised that prima facie exclusionary 
conduct could be justified on grounds of efficiency, it is noteworthy that similar 
considerations have played a part on the assessment of other forms of abusive 
behaviour, such as loyalty discounts and rebates.152  The ECJ recognised in Portugal 
v Commission that even dominant undertakings could offer discounts or rebates to 
their customers calculated exclusively on the basis of the volume purchased by each 
buyer,153 since making larger purchases of a given product or services allowed the 
buyer and the seller to gain economies of scales arising from the reduced transaction 
costs.154 Therefore, they would be allowed to accord lower average unit prices to 
larger purchasers of a given product,155 unless the system was not operated in a 
discriminatory or otherwise abusive manner.156   
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         In her Opinion in the British Airways appeal judgment157 AG Kokott suggested 
that the assessment of rebate or discount schemes, whether based on quantity or on 
other factors,158 should depend on two objective criteria.  It should be demonstrated 
that, firstly, the scheme prevented competing suppliers from accessing the market 
and therefore customers from choosing between alternative sources of supply, and, 
secondly, that there was no “objective economic justification for the rebates or 
bonuses granted”,159 because any foreclosure effect could not be “compensated (…) 
for, or more than compensated for, by efficiency advantages which also 
demonstrably [accrued] to consumers.”160 
         The ECJ161 accepted this framework for analysis and held that, regardless of 
the formal definition given to the rebate scheme, its legality should be scrutinised in 
its economic and legal context and focus on its actual impact on competition and 
consumers.162  If the scheme had “exclusionary effects (...) [which bore] no relation to 
advantages for the market and consumers”, or went “beyond what [was] necessary 
(…) to attain those advantages, that system must be regarded as an abuse.”163 
         In the light of the British Airways judgment, and despite the undeniable 
differences between the two cases, it could be argued that the CFI in Microsoft, 
rather than dismissing the applicant’s arguments as “vague”, should have engaged in 
the analysis of the implications of the remedy imposed by the 2004 decision for the 
applicant’s incentives to innovate.  As was explained above, imposing an obligation 
to license intellectual property rights to competitors could have adverse effects on the 
perspective of “reward” for their holder’s investments164  and should therefore be 
carefully assessed not so much vis-à-vis the innovation trends of the overall industry, 
as suggested by the CFI, but against the drive of the dominant undertaking to invest 
in future research and development.165 
         It is suggested that the CFI was heavily influenced by the similarities 
between Microsoft and Commercial Solvents and especially by the fact 
that in both cases the applicant had discontinued an existing pattern of 
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supply of “inputs” considered to be “essential” to long-standing 
customers.166  However, it is argued that the application of standards 
developed for the interruption of supply of “raw materials” to cases 
involving copyrighted input in highly technological markets may not be an 
entirely appropriate solution.   
         It emerges from Commercial Solvents that the ECJ was concerned 
with avoiding that the applicant, to pursue its plans to vertically integrate 
the production of raw components together with that of derivative 
products, could extend its market power from the upstream to the 
downstream market and thereby put its customer out of business.  
Consequently, it could be argued that the very tangible risk that the 
applicant could leverage its market power on the downstream market 
“trumped” any other considerations, even those related to supposed 
efficiency gains.  
         Against this background, it is submitted that this approach appears 
very difficult to reconcile with the peculiar nature of the IT industry, which 
is heavily dependent on innovation and on the steady flow of the 
necessary investment.167  It is suggested that since obliging the owner of 
copyrighted inputs to “share the fruits of its labour” with its competitors 
could endanger its incentive to engage in research and development, the 
antitrust authorities should carefully consider whether in the 
circumstances of each case imposing a duty to licence for the purpose of 
boosting competition would benefit future technical development and 
thereby increase consumer welfare.168  
         It is added that the position currently adopted as regards the 
“efficiency defence” does not seem capable of address fully these 
concerns.  On this point, it was argued that “putting the efficiency defence 
at the tail end of the analysis” places dominant undertakings under a 
significant burden of proof by requiring them to demonstrate that anti-
competitive practices having adverse effects on consumer welfare could 
actually not be caught by Article 82 on account of their efficiency 
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enhancing effects.169  Also, the CFI’s approach, being focused on the short 
term impact of the practice on the patterns of the industry as a whole, 
does not seem to allow for any assessment of its impact on the incentive 
to invest and innovate of the dominant undertaking.  Consequently, it 
could be argued that the current concept of “efficiency defence” is not 
only difficult to satisfy but also inherently unsuitable for the analysis of 
the impact of a duty to disclose on the future innovation plans of the 
industrial leader as well as on the overall trends of development of the 
market.170  
          In the light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the Microsoft case 
confronted the CFI with the problems arising from applying existing standards 
developed for more “traditional” industries to conduct affecting highly innovative 
markets and demonstrated that the existing conditions laid down in the case law may 
not be entirely suitable to practices taking place in highly competitive markets, where 
it is indispensable to consider not only the short term impact but also the long term 
effects of allegedly exclusionary practices on the incentives to invest in research and 
development.171  The next section will consider the guidelines for the assessment of 
exclusionary conduct laid down by the Commission in 2008172 with a view to assess 
the extent to which the future directions of the Commission’s enforcement policy are 
capable of addressing these concerns.      
 
The Commission 2008 Guidance and highly technological industries: a bundle 
of unresolved questions? 
 
Toward the 2008 Guidance: high hopes for a more “economic-based” approach to 
Article 82 EC Treaty? 
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Section 2 illustrated how the approach adopted by the Commission and the CFI in 
Microsoft and argued that it may not be entirely appropriate to adjudge the 
compliance of refusals to grant IP licenses in technological markets beyond the 
circumstances of that case.  It was also argued that the Commission and the Court’s 
reliance on standards developed in the context of “traditional” industries, and 
especially in respect of the refusal to supply “raw materials”,173 could increase the 
risk of “distorting” the incentive to invest in further development and encourage 
competition based on “follow on”, “replica” innovation rather than on the development 
of a new “breakthrough” technology. 
         The elaboration of the 2008 Guidance on the enforcement priorities in the 
application of Article 82 EC Treaty therefore provided the Commission with a 
significant opportunity to address the concerns raised by the case law.  Already in its 
2005 Discussion Paper the Commission had reiterated that refusals to deal with 
other firms may only “exceptionally” be abusive.174  It specified that this could occur in 
a number of cases ranging from the interruption of existing commercial relations with 
a competitor to the refusal to grant to a rival an IP licence regarding “valuable” 
information to, lastly, the denial of access to an “essential” facility such as network or 
other physical infrastructures that are necessary to operate on the same or on a 
neighbouring market.175  The Commission would be required to show that the refusal 
concerned an input that was necessary for the buyer to perform a specific business 
activity and was therefore such as to foreclose competition on a downstream 
market,176 either by driving competitors out of the market or by preventing potential 
rivals from attempting to enter it.177 
          Having regard to refusals to deal with rivals, the Discussion Paper 
differentiated conduct affecting existing customers from practices concerning “new 
buyers” and in that context drew a line between conduct affecting tangible property 
and the refusal to grant intellectual property licences.178  In respect of refusals to deal 
with “new buyers”, the Commission stated that five conditions would have to be 
satisfied to establish an infringement of Article 82: the practice must constitute a 
“refusal to supply”; the supplier must be dominant on the market for the supply of the 
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product in question and the latter must be “indispensable”;179 the refusal must also 
have market distorting foreclosure effects and must not be objectively justified.180   
         The “indispensability” requirement was read as meaning that the “duplication” 
of the input in question would be “impossible or excessively difficult either because it 
is physically or legally impossible to duplicate or [that] (…) a second facility (…) 
would not generate enough revenues to cover its costs.”181  Having regard to the 
market distorting foreclosure effects, the Paper stated that their assessment would 
depend on the extent to which the practice had an adverse impact on the pre-existing 
levels of competition on the relevant market, in the light of the number of remaining 
competitors, the identity and the size of the excluded firm.182   
         In relation to the concept of objective justification, the Commission 
acknowledged the possibility even for a dominant undertaking to refuse supplies to 
buyers unable to show “appropriate commercial assurances”183 or for the purpose of 
recouping the investment made to manufacture the output.184  The Discussion Paper 
made clear that an additional condition would have to be met for the purpose of a 
finding of abuse, when the refusal affected IP licences: the conduct must prevent “the 
development of a market for which the licence is an indispensable input, to the 
detriment of consumers.”185  In the light of the IMS Health preliminary ruling the 
Commission added that this condition would be fulfilled if the firm seeking the licence 
does not plan only to replicate existing goods or services but intends to manufacture 
“new products” for which potential consumer demand existed.186 
         However, consistently with the Microsoft 2004 decision, the Commission added 
that the refusal to grant access to technologies necessary for “follow-on innovation 
may be abusive even if the licence is not sought to directly incorporate the 
technology in identifiable new goods and services” 187 but only to improve available 
products.188  The Commission emphasised that consumers should be allowed to 
benefit from “innovation brought about by the dominant undertaking’s competitors”,  
thus subscribing in substance to a view of technical development and competition as 
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a “cooperative process to which all undertaking, even less efficient ones, should be 
allowed to participate.189   
            Finally, the Discussion Paper briefly dealt with the refusal to supply 
interoperability information and stated that it may not be appropriate to subject this 
practice to “the same high standards for intervention” applicable to refusals to grant 
IP licences.190  Accordingly, it was stated that, although there was no “general 
obligation” even for dominant companies to ensure interoperability, denying access 
to interface protocols would infringe Article 82 EC Treaty if it could be shown that as 
a result of it the dominant firm was able to marginalise other suppliers from a related 
market and therefore extend its lead to it.191   
         It emerges from this brief analysis of the 2005 Discussion Paper that the 
Commission was keen to adopt a rather interventionist stance in respect of refusals 
to deal with rivals, including the denial of IP licenses.192  Having regard to access to 
information ensuring interoperability between a “de facto standard” and alternative 
products in markets where compatibility constituted a key factor for the continuing 
existence of competition, it is suggested that, although the Discussion Paper 
expressed concern for the potential impact of forced disclosure on future 
investments, the standards put forward by the Commission seemed more generous 
in relation to interoperability information, including interface protocols in the software 
industry than that laid down in IMS Health,193 thus subordinating the needs for 
innovation to the continuation of supply of alternative, but not “new”, products.194   
        The next section will asses the extent to which the 2008 Guidance has marked 
a marked progress toward a more “economics-based” approach to the interpretation 
of Article 82 EC Treaty, especially in relation to exclusionary conduct in highly 
technological industries. 
 
The 2008 Guidance and the legacy of ‘Microsoft’: nil novum sub soli?  
 
Given the limited scope of this article, the above section could only give a very brief 
account of the 2005 Discussion Paper.  Nonetheless, it appears from it that the 
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Commission, despite being aware of the potentially adverse implications of forced 
disclosure of inputs covered by intellectual property rights, was inclined to adopt a 
rather generous approach in the application of Article 82 to refusals to grant licences 
to rivals, especially concerning interoperability information.  It is submitted that the 
rationale underlying the enforcement priorities does not appear to have significantly 
changed in the 2008 Guidance.195   
         As a general point, the Commission stated that its enforcement would seek to 
protect consumer welfare by targeting conduct hampering the proper functioning of 
the market by prejudicing especially the “efficiency and productivity which result from 
effective competition between undertakings”.196  Its action is, therefore, likely to 
concentrate on “safeguarding the competitive process in the internal market” and on 
preventing dominant undertakings from “exclud[ing] their competitors by any other 
means than competing on the merits of (…) products or services (…)”.197  
         Having regard specifically to refusals to deal, the 2008 Guidance reiterates that 
all undertakings, including those enjoying market power, are free to select their 
business partners.198  Therefore “intervention on competition law grounds requires 
careful consideration” when it could result in the imposition of an obligation to deal 
with other firms and could jeopardise the incentive to invest in new technologies.199  
The Commission expresses concern that forcing dominant firms to “share the fruits of 
their labour” may undermine consumer welfare by hampering their drive to innovate 
as well as encouraging competing suppliers to “free ride” on the investments made 
by a powerful rival.200   
         In the light of these considerations, the 2008 Guidance states that a refusal to 
deal with another firm active on a “downstream market”, namely a market “for which 
the refused input is needed in order to manufacture a product or provide a service”201 
will constitute an “enforcement priority” only if three requirements are satisfied:  the 
input in question must “be objectively necessary in order to compete effectively” on 
the market concerned; its refusal must be “likely to lead to the elimination of effective 
competition on the downstream market” and finally, must be capable of leading to 
consumer harm.202 
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         In relation to the requirement of “objective necessity”, the Guidance states that 
an input is likely to fulfil this condition if “there is no actual or potential substitute” for it 
allowing competing suppliers “to counter—at least in the long term—the negative 
consequences of the refusal.”203  The Commission will concentrate on whether it is 
possible for alternative suppliers to duplicate the input in question and thereby exert 
a degree of competitive pressure on the dominant undertaking.204   
         However, this concept may be contrasted with the notion of “indispensability” 
arising from the case law and crystallised in the 2005 Discussion Paper.  The 
Commission had taken the view, in the light of the Bronner judgment, that an input 
would be indispensable if without it “companies cannot manufacture their products or 
provide their usual services”205 and its duplication would be “impossible or extremely 
difficult either because it is legally or economically impossible” to do so or because 
the additional facility would not “generate enough revenues to cover its costs”.206 
         It is argued that the 2008 Guidance may have been influenced by the notion of 
“indispensability” prevailing in Microsoft, which, rather than focusing on whether the 
interoperability protocols could be “duplicated” by competing suppliers,207 
emphasised the importance of interoperability to enable competing suppliers to 
operate viably on the relevant market.208   Against this background, it is suggested 
that this view of “objective necessity” appears far more “liberal” than the concept of 
“indispensability” resulting from Bronner since it seems to concentrate more on the 
possibility for competitors to remain viably on the market without accessing the input 
or information209 at the expense of an examination of whether alternative suppliers 
can “duplicate” that “necessary” proprietary input.  Also, it does not appear to give 
sufficient weight to the availability of alternatives to compulsory access that allow 
competitors to continue operating profitably on the relevant market, such as “reverse 
engineering”.210 
         The influence of Microsoft on the 2008 Guidance emerges also from paragraph 
84 of the document, according to which the interruption of an existing level of supply 
of “necessary” inputs would be “more likely to be found to be abusive than a de novo 
refusal to supply”.211   According to the Commission, the fact that the dominant 
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undertaking has “found it is in its interest to supply” in the past constitutes evidence 
that it does not regard the continued supply as threatening its incentive to innovate or 
the value of its investment.212  This “presumption” could only be rebutted by showing 
an “actual change” of the circumstances as a result of which continuing to grant 
access to the input is no longer capable of securing “adequate compensation” for the 
investment.213   
         It is suggested that this approach appears consistent with the principles 
enshrined in the Commercial Solvents judgment214 which had heavily influenced 
Microsoft and with the view that the interruption of the supply of the protocols would 
constitute abusive behaviour even though it had not resulted in the “immediate 
marginalisation” of competing work group server OS producers but was only “likely to 
result” in the elimination of competition.215  However, it could be argued that this view 
would not be appropriate for the assessment of these practices in highly 
technological industries where forcing the supply of valuable inputs could adversely 
affect innovation.216 
         Having regard to the other requirement of eliminating effective competition, the 
2008 Guidance states that the fulfilment of this condition would depend on a number 
of factors, such as the degree of market power enjoyed by the dominant undertaking, 
the extent to which the latter could act appreciably independently of alternative 
suppliers and whether a significant number of customers had been affected by the 
conduct in question.217   
         This approach is substantially consistent with the 2005 Discussion Paper, 
according to which a refusal to deal would be likely to result in “market distorting 
foreclosure effects” if, having regard to the market conditions, the number and the 
size of alternative suppliers and affected customers, and the likely elimination or 
marginalisation of a competitor are likely to have an adverse effect on competition.218  
It may, therefore, be expected that factors such as the market shares of competing 
firms, their trends and the conditions of entry or expansion would be taken into 
account by the Commission. 
         In relation to the requirement of likely consumer harm resulting from a refusal to 
deal, the Commission is likely to investigate cases in which “for consumers, the likely 
negative consequences of a refusal to supply in the relevant market outweigh over 
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time the negative consequences of imposing an obligation to supply.”219  The 2008 
Guidance states that this is likely to occur not only when, as the ECJ had affirmed in 
IMS Health,220 the refusal would prevent the undertakings seeking access to the input 
from offering “new” products or services, namely, output that is not a “duplicate” of 
what is already available on the relevant market221 but also if it hampered their ability 
to engage in “follow on innovation”.222 A refusal to grant IP licences would therefore 
become an enforcement priority when, without preventing the emergence of “novel” 
products, it resulted in competition becoming unable to offer “improved goods or 
services for which there is a potential demand” or which “contribute to technical 
development”.223   
         The Commission, therefore, confirmed that it would take action to tackle 
conduct jeopardising “second generation” technical development and, thereby, 
hampering competition “on the market”.  Its statement is, therefore ,consistent with 
the literal interpretation of Article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty, adopted by the CFI 2007 
Microsoft judgment, according to which a refusal to grant an IP licence would infringe 
the antitrust rules when it limited “production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers”.224   
         Finally, in respect of the concept of “objective justification”, the Guidance 
document is silent on the possibility of a dominant firm claiming that its prima facie 
exclusionary conduct may be justified on the grounds of its being necessary to 
recoup the investment made to develop the input concerned.225  In relation to the 
concept of “efficiencies”, instead, the Guidance reiterates the four condition test laid 
down in the 2005 Discussion Paper226 and recognises the possibility for a dominant 
undertaking to claim that its refusal to grant access to an “indispensable input” is 
necessary to protect its incentive to further innovate or to safeguard the value of its 
investment from possible negative factors, including the “development of follow-on 
innovation by competitors.”227   
         The concept of “efficiency defence” laid down in the 2008 Guidance could, 
therefore, be criticised not only because it places a dominant undertaking under a 
considerable onus to prove that conduct liable to hamper competition and harm 
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consumers would, ultimately, have efficiency enhancing effects;228 it also appears to 
emphasise a “consumer driven” notion which would not allow antitrust enforcers to 
gauge the long term implications of their intervention for the incentives for the 
dominant company and its rivals to innovate.229 
          In addition, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the 2008 Guidance states that the 
interruption of an existing supply relationship may be less likely to benefit from the 
defence.  Consequently, it could be criticised again for its emphasis on protecting 
“follow on” innovation at the expense of safeguarding the value of the innovator’s 
investment and of its drive to engage in future innovation.230  Consequently, it could 
be argued that it would not fully reflect the longer term implications of forced 
disclosure on technical development in high tech markets. 
         In the light of the above analysis, it is contended that, while it may be early to 
gauge the full impact of the 2008 Guidance document on the future application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, there are a number of reasons why 
the suggested approach may not be entirely appropriate to ensuring effective 
innovation-driven competition in highly technological markets: it seems to focus more 
on the short term impact of refusals to deal than on their implication for the affected 
market in the long haul and prefers a seemingly lenient view of “objective necessity” 
and a rather restrictive test for the “efficiency defence”. 
         It may be wondered whether the application of a more rigorous 
approach to the concept of “indispensability” could have had some impact 
on the outcome of the Microsoft appeal.  It may be recalled that, perhaps 
surprisingly, the CFI did not assess in detail whether the availability of 
“open source” software or the possibility to “reverse engineer” the de 
facto standard PC OS could be suitable alternatives to the forced 
disclosure of the interconnection protocols.231  Against this background, it 
could be argued that an interpretation of this concept in a manner more 
consistent with the IMS Health decision, being dependent on “objective 
factors”, such as the presence of physical or legal obstacles to the 
duplication of the “essential input”, would have obliged, at the very least, 
                                                 
228
 Supra, section 2.3.  See e.g. Larouche, “The European Microsoft case at the crossroads of 
competition policy and innovation”, cit. (footnote 62), p. 12-13. 
229
 Ibid. 
230
 2008 Guidance, para. 89. 
231
 Id., para. 381; see, e.g., case C-7/97, BronnerGmbH & Co v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791, para. 
47. 
 33 
the Court to examine more closely the Commission’s conclusions on this 
issue.232   
         On this point, it is suggested that, although due to the 
overwhelming market power enjoyed by the applicant the Court would 
have probably reached the same conclusions, adopting a more objective 
and thus more exacting assessment of the concept of “indispensability” 
could have an influence on future cases, perhaps not involving super-
dominant companies, and could therefore limit compulsory sharing only to 
cases when it is objectively not possible to secure an alternative to them 
due to physical or legal obstacles or serious financial consequences flowing 
from duplicating the essential inputs.233 
         In relation to the concept of “harm to consumer welfare” suggested by the 2008 
Guidance, it is acknowledged that assessing the degree of novelty of “second- 
generation” inventions, as required by the IMS notion of “new product”, may not be 
straightforward.  However, it is submitted that, to require that the Commission 
demonstrates that the undertaking seeking access wishes to develop and supply a 
product displaying a significant degree of “novelty” vis-à-vis products already 
available, would go some way toward ensuring that the needs of technical 
development and those of genuine competition are appropriately taken into account 
and weighed against one another.  Commentators suggested that this appraisal 
would offer “a minimal protection of the interest of the (…) IPR holder”,234 by 
confining the reach of Article 82 to refusals preventing competing suppliers from 
seeking access only for the purpose of duplicating the same “basic” software and 
thereby minimising the risk of “cloning” the industry standard.235 
         Nonetheless, in the light of the 2008 Guidance, it seems unlikely that the 
Commission will backtrack to a more conservative view of refusals to grant IP 
licences in the near future.  Consequently, it may be concluded that the Microsoft 
litigation, despite its inherently extraordinary circumstances, has strongly influenced 
the current approaches to exclusionary behaviour.  However, it is questionable 
whether this outcome, suitable though it may be for practices adopted by “super-
                                                 
232
 See e.g. Hatzopoulos, “Refusals to deal: the EC “essential facilities” doctrine”, in Amato and 
Ehlermann (Eds), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2007: Oxford/Portland, Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, p. 348-349 
233
 See e.g. Hatzopoulos, “Refusals to deal: the EC “essential facilities” doctrine”, in Amato and 
Ehlermann (Eds), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2007: Oxford/Portland, Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, p. 348-349 
234
 Id., p. 354. 
235
 Id., p. 339. 
 34 
dominant” companies, may be equally appropriate in other cases, especially those 
concerning refusals to license in innovation driven industries and not involving firms 
enjoying market power to the same extent as Microsoft. 
 
Refusals to deal in highly technological markets: where to now?  Tentative 
conclusions 
 
The previous sections analysed the approach to refusals to deal by dominant 
undertakings under Article 82 of the EC Treaty resulting from the Microsoft litigation 
and attempted to place it in the wider context of the needs of innovation driven 
competition characterising highly technological, R&D driven industries.  This article 
argued that the rather generous interpretation of the “indispensability” and the “new 
product” conditions236  could jeopardise the incentive of the holder of the “leading 
format” to continue innovating its products.  It was pointed out that recourse to forced 
disclosure could overtime hamper the incentive to innovate throughout the industry 
since it would, in substance, encourage “follow on”, emulation-based development 
and, thus, divert resources away from efforts to create new “breakthrough” products”.   
         The article considered, then, whether the recent Guidance on the enforcement 
priorities of the Commission in the application of Article 82 could have gone some 
way toward redressing this perceived “imbalance” between protecting competition on 
the market, especially by means of boosting “second generation innovation”, and 
furthering competition for the market. The analysis of the 2008 document highlighted 
a number of similarities with the approach adopted in Microsoft as well as a number 
of potential pitfalls in the Commission’s position.  It was contended that too lenient an 
interpretation of the “new product” requirement could de facto deprive it of its ability 
to “balance” of the needs of genuine competition against the demands of the pursuit 
of innovation and eventually hamper consumer welfare.237  The perceived difficulties 
in meeting the requirements of the “efficiency defence” could raise additional 
questions on their ability to “capture” the implications of forced disclosure for the 
innovation trends and incentives in R&D driven markets. 
         For this reason, it was argued that a “return” to the concepts of 
“indispensability” and of “new product” emerging from the IMS Health preliminary 
ruling could go some way toward balancing the needs of technical progress against 
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genuine competition, especially on markets for complementary products.  However, 
in the light of the decided commitment to the “interventionist” stance adopted in the 
2008 Guidance, it was submitted that such a move seems unlikely at this stage. 
         Against this background it is concluded that while, due to its exceptional 
features, the conclusions reached in the Microsoft judgment could not be easily 
applied beyond its merits, its indirect impact should not be downplayed.238  Although 
it is premature to assess its overall implications for future decisions, it is clear that the 
2008 Guidance constitutes evidence of the weighty legacy of the 2007 judgment for 
the interpretation of Article 82.  It also suggests that, for all the initial commitments 
toward a more “economics-based” approach to exclusionary behaviour,239 a more 
flexible, more realistic and thus more appropriate framework for the analysis of these 
practices, even in “less traditional” industries, may be yet to emerge.  
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